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Abstract 
South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) has been in 
existence for 29 years, but has made slow progress. Despite this, many 
countries within and outside the region aspire to be part of this forum. As a 
result, SAARC is the only association in the world, which has more observer 
members (nine), than full-fledged members (eight). China is presently the 
observer member in SAARC, and working towards enhancing its role to 
“dialogue partner” and later on obtaining the full membership. However, 
China’s SAARC membership is widely debated. In this context, the paper 
attempts to analyse the arguments in favour and against China’s membership 
and examines India’s position and concerns vis-à-vis China’s elevated role 
in SAARC. Subsequently, it identifies and discusses the factors favouring 
China to become a full fledge member of SAARC. This paper concludes that 
China’s SAARC membership might become inevitable at some time in the 
future. However, the question is – can India intelligently and sophisticatedly 
play its cards to advance its own interests?
Keywords: China, SAARC, India, South Asia
1. Introduction
China’s foreign policy has evolved in recent decades to consolidate Chinese 
interests. For other interested countries, this could indeed become a lesson as 
to how to consolidate and promote their own national interests (Mahapatra, 
2010; Patten, 2010). Initially, China’s Asia policy focused on Northeast 
and Southeast Asia. But in recent times, South Asia has gained tremendous 
importance in China’s foreign policy, which currently aims to maintain and 
promote regional peace and stability and, in consequence sustain China’s 
own peaceful rise. Also, as India began to look eastward, China began to look 
southward to counter India’s rise. In this context, South Asia constitutes an 
important region for China’s strategic ambit.
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Five factors may be cited as primarily having shaped China’s South Asia 
policy. First, South Asia, located midway between the oil-rich Middle East 
and Southeast Asia, is strategically important for China. South Asian countries 
also have common borders with China, giving China an alternative option of 
opening direct access through South Asia to the international sea lanes of the 
Indian Ocean, which would enhance safe trade. Second, South Asia is rich 
in natural resources such as coal, iron ore and hydrocarbon derivatives, some 
of them yet to be fully explored. The region also has growing economies and 
millions of population, providing enormous potential for trade and a huge 
market for Chinese goods. Third, the Indian Ocean region is also vital for 
China’s growth. China’s oil consumption will increase by 150 per cent by 
2020, of which imports will account for more than 75 per cent (Holmes et al., 
2010: 129). At the same time, there are serious security threats to China in 
the Indian Ocean region like piracy, terrorism, drug and material trafficking, 
and weapons of mass destruction. Ensuring security for Chinese interests in 
the Indian Ocean is facilitated by close coordination with the South Asian 
countries. Fourth, South Asia will play a critical role in China’s ambitious 
21st century Maritime Silk Road (MSR) initiative. Under this initiative, 
China plans to build a maze of Silk Roads, which includes revival of the 
ancient Silk Road, connecting China with Central Asia, Europe, and the 
Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar (BCIM) Economic Corridor. Subsequently, 
the MSR also aims to connect various ports in the region to increase trade. In 
this regard, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Maldives have already agreed to be 
part of this initiative. Fifth, although China’s South Asia policy is no longer 
Indo-centric, due to the changing security environment in the region, India 
continues to be a key factor in shaping China’s policy towards South Asia, 
since India has emerged as an economic power, combined with growing 
military, nuclear weapon and missile capability. Subsequently, India’s growing 
strategic partnership with the US and Japan also continues to be a security 
concern for China. 
Thus, in the overall perspective, China’s South Asia policy is aimed at 
sustaining its rise and China can be stable and progress towards prosperity 
only when the neighbourhood is stable and prosperous (Raman, 2011). This 
aspect was emphasised by President Xi Jinping, “a peaceful, stable and 
prosperous South Asia conforms to China’s interests and that China is willing 
to align its development strategies with those of South Asian countries to 
achieve mutually beneficial development and common prosperity” (Rajan, 
2015). At the same time, China wishes to increase its own influence in the 
region; address the transnational issues; nibble at India’s influence; reduce the 
ability of potentially hostile powers like the US and Japan to harm China’s 
interests in the region; and work towards win-win cooperation and promote 
multilateralism (Paptheologou et al., 2014: 288). In this multifarious quest, 
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the South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation (SAARC) becomes a 
vital forum for sustaining China’s rise. 
2. China and SAARC
Although SAARC is not a vibrant association like Association for Southeast 
Asian Nation (ASEAN) or European Union (EU), but it is the only grouping 
which comprises all members of the South Asian region. China became a 
SAARC observer member at the Dhaka Summit in 2005, with Pakistan, 
Nepal and Bangladesh supporting the move, and India, Bhutan, Afghanistan 
and Maldives opposing it. Ever since, China has made significant progress in 
terms of its participation in SAARC. The China-South Asia Business Forum, 
founded in 2004, which primarily focuses on “communication, cooperation, 
development and mutual benefits”, has been further strengthened with 
China’s engagement with SAARC. In 2006, the China-South Asia Business 
Council was established to act as a link between Chinese companies and 
SAARC Chambers of Commerce and Industry. From 2007, it has attended 
the successive SAARC summits; it continues to invite senior diplomats from 
the region to China; and has hosted the South Asian countries’ commodity fair 
and China-SAARC senior officials’ meeting. In June 2013, a major initiative 
was the China-South Asia Exposition, with Bangladesh as the theme country 
for that year (Kondapalli, 2014: 8). Moreover, China has also strengthened 
its foothold through funding various development projects in the region 
like under the SAARC Development Fund (SDF), it pledged US$300,000 
(ibid). In 2014, China even nominated an envoy for SAARC, indicating 
the significance it attaches to this grouping. Apart from this, the high level 
bilateral visit between China and SAARC countries has strengthened the 
political, economic and military ties and also allowed China to play a greater 
role in SAARC, thus to certain extent reducing India’s role. Overall, China’s 
role in SAARC is limited by its observer status, the slow progress of SAARC 
itself, and India’s increased role and the increased presence of the US and 
Japan in the region, which act as counterweights to China. Nevertheless, this 
has not prevented China from aspiring to become a full member of SAARC. 
3. The Debate 
SAARC has been in existence for 29 years but has made slow progress. One 
reason for this sluggish growth has been that its members are at sixes and 
sevens on several key issues affecting this regional body. China’s full-fledged 
membership is one of them. One group argues in favour, on the grounds that 
China is geographically close to South Asia, sharing borders with India, 
Nepal, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Bhutan. As an observer member, it has 
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contributed significantly to the progress of SAARC in several ways and the 
profile of SAARC will be enhanced in the international political economy 
if the association comprises both India and China, being the world’s fastest 
growing economies, most populous countries and significant players in global 
politics, economics and security affairs (Mahapatra, 2011: 512). Furthermore, 
it has overwhelming support from Pakistan, Nepal, Bangladesh and Sri 
Lanka for obtaining membership. At successive SAARC summits, these 
countries have strongly and consistently pitched for a rising profile for China 
in SAARC from an “Observer member” to “Dialogue Partner.” The main 
intentions of these countries favouring China is to limit India’s dominance 
in the region, as the former can be a counterweight to India’s power within 
the structure and also to benefit from its economic, political and military 
engagement with China. 
On the other hand, the arguments opposing China’s SAARC membership 
run along the following lines. First, SAARC is already affected by the 
shadow of the India-Pakistan fault line. For example, SAARC is the least 
economically integrated region: the intra-regional SAARC trade is less than 
5 per cent of SAARC worldwide trade. In comparison, ASEAN has 25 per 
cent intra-regional trade and EU has 60 per cent. Ironically, under British 
colonial rule, intra-regional trade in this region was about 20 per cent, but 
now it is marginal (Kumar, 2014: 2). Thus, many argue that inclusion of 
China will create another shadow of the India-China fault line, leading to 
nominal trade. Subsequently, SAARC is already a complicated forum, and 
could get further complicated with the inclusion of China. Second, China is an 
undemocratic country, which has been seriously criticised by the international 
community for its human rights record. But this argument falls flat on its face, 
as most of the South Asian countries are fragile democracies, with some of 
them being strongly inclined to military rule like Pakistan and Bangladesh. 
Third, China has close ties with SAARC countries in all realms, which will 
facilitate its domination of the organisation. The China-Pakistan “all-weather 
friendship” would further undermine India’s profile in SAARC. Fourth, 
China can meaningfully engage with SAARC even without full membership. 
For example, ASEAN has strong economic ties with China, but China still 
remains a non-member (Dutta, 2011: 501). Thus, SAARC can adopt the same 
pattern. However, unlike in ASEAN in which the majority of the members 
want to keep China out, in SAARC half the members are openly advocating 
China’s entry, and as a result, keeping China outside of the membership 
might not be possible in the long run. Fifth, it is also argued that China’s 
entry will undermine India’s influence/dominance in SAARC, like it has 
successfully done to Russia in Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). 
For example, China has become the largest trading partner for Central Asian 
countries (excluding Uzbekistan) and its investment stood at US$45 billion 
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(2012), more than Russia (Sharma, 2015). Thus, China has been successful 
in reducing Russia’s economic dominance in Central Asian countries, and 
this might be replicated also in SAARC. Sixth, another strong argument has 
been that China will work towards curtailing India’s interest. For example, 
China has consistently tried to block India’s entry into several forums in the 
Asian region, such as ASEAN, ASEAN Region Forum (ARF) and East Asian 
Summit (EAS). But, many argue that in SAARC, decisions are based on 
unanimity, so India still can veto China entry. Moreover, China invited India 
to participate in Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meeting in 2014 
and has been supporting India in deepening its partnership with the SCO. At 
the same time, India could not prevent China’s entry as observer member, as 
India wanted Afghanistan to be a SAARC member. Pakistan was opposed 
to Afghanistan’s entry; hence, as a tactical compromise, India had to allow 
China’s observer membership in SAARC. 
Nevertheless, India has hitherto successfully blocked China’s attempt to 
become a full-fledged member of SAARC, on the grounds that SAARC needs 
to work towards strengthening its ties with new partners, rather than expanding 
membership. In March 2014, Salman Khrushid, India’s former Minister for 
External Affairs, emphasised at the SAARC foreign ministers’ meeting in 
Male, Maldives, that “some of the observer states have done commendable 
work with our association, but it is important that we define a clear set of 
policies and objectives for these relationships and their future direction, before 
we move further” (Kasturi, 2014). Moreover, India is concerned about China’s 
growing influence in the region and China’s entry into SAARC will naturally 
reduce India’s leverage, which currently is strong within this grouping. Thus, 
India believes, if China becomes member of SAARC, then it would obviously 
undermine India’s interest and complicate SAARC. 
4. Factors Favouring China’s Membership
Despite the reservation from India over China becoming a member, sooner or 
later China will become a member and it will be beneficial for India as well 
as for the growth of SAARC. Some of the vital factors favouring China are 
as follows.
First, from time to time, several Chinese leaders and scholars have 
argued that China is closely connected to South Asia in terms of geographical 
proximity, strong socio-economic engagement, political interactions, and 
historical links. In other words, China is not an extra-regional power, but can 
become a legitimate member. 
Second, India’s attempt to contain China’s growing influence in SAARC 
has been counterproductive. The more India is opposing, China continues to 
garner more support in its favour. Subsequently, except for India, no other 
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members, including observer members such as the US, the EU, Japan, Iran or 
Australia have opposed China’s enhanced role in SAARC. At the 2011 summit 
in the Maldives, due to pressure from other members, India had to settle for a 
“comprehensive review” of its engagement with observer states, including the 
prospect of dialogue partnership (DNA, 2014). Thus, it has become difficult 
for India to keep China out of the SAARC forum. 
Third, Pakistan, Nepal, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka have made their 
support clear for China’s membership at every SAARC summit in recent years 
and Pakistan will be hosting the 2015 SAARC summit, which will be a testing 
ground for India to oppose China’s membership. Apparently, Nepal’s support 
was particularly visible at the 18th SAARC summit in November 2014, where 
Nepal’s Finance Minister Ram Sharan Mahat stated, “Over the course of time, 
[China] should become a full-fledged member”; former Foreign Minister 
Ramesh Nath Pandey argued that “China’s active presence in SAARC will 
increase its importance and the speed of development in Asia. We should not 
keep China as an observer only” (Roy and Yubaraj, 2014). The Asia Pacific 
Daily, published by the Xinhua news agency, Kathmandu bureau, brought out 
a 12-page special edition for the 18th SAARC summit in which at least three 
Nepal cabinet ministers and two former foreign ministers supported Beijing’s 
case (ibid). More recently, at the International Conference organised by the 
think tanks in Pakistan, China’s full membership for the growth of SAARC 
were widely advocated (The Express Tribune, 2015). Hence, even without 
the presence of China, many SAARC members speak in favour of China’s 
membership. Given this scenario, it does not seem a diplomatic option for 
India to block China’s enhanced role in SAARC for much longer. 
Fourth, within India itself, opinion is growing in favour of China’s 
membership in SAARC. For instance, Subramanian Swamy, a senior BJP 
leader, delivering the Lalith Athulathmudali Memorial Lecture at Colombo 
in November 2014, argued that SAARC “should have China as a full-time 
member … without including bilateral issues in the agenda and bringing 
China into the association, it is a sheer waste of time speaking about SAARC” 
(The Sunday Times, 2014). Although, the Narendra Modi government 
may not officially endorse China’s bid, but its key members are in favour 
of it, indicating the growing support for China’s candidature. Moreover, 
Former Union Minister Jairam Ramesh talks about “Chindia” (China+India) 
as a partnership that would benefit the region. Hence, China’s SAARC 
membership would be the testing ground for this premise. 
Fifth, China is currently the largest trading partner for South Asian 
countries. It has a Free Trade Arrangement (FTA) with Pakistan and 
negotiations are in progress with Sri Lanka for a similar understanding. 
Moreover, China’s trade with South Asia has substantially increased to 
US$93 billion in 2012, with imports from the region at US$22.6 billion and 
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exports to the region at 3.44 per cent (Xinhuanet, 2014). China’s investments 
in SAARC countries are about US$4 billion and China’s former Foreign 
Minister Liu Zhenmin announced at the SAARC summit (November 2014) 
an investment of US$45.6 billion for an economic corridor with Pakistan 
and promised to take trade between South Asia and China to US$150 billion 
and investment to US$30 billion in the next five years (Kondapalli, 2014; 
Chansoria, 2015). Furthermore, China and SAARC’s economic integration 
will create a huge market with 2.8 billion people, enhancing industrialisation, 
increasing employment, capital and infrastructure development. Thus, China’s 
growing economic engagement with the SAARC region is certainly a matter 
to be noted in its favour, which will be beneficial for economic integration 
of SAARC. 
Sixth, China has been adducing initiatives at successive SAARC summits 
that are attractive and beneficial for SAARC and the region. Among these are: 
the BCIM economic corridor; China-Pakistan Economic Corridor; the MSR; 
the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), and the establishment of 
a US$40 billion fund to facilitate infrastructure projects for the Silk Road 
initiative. China’s former Foreign Minister Liu Zhenmin has also spoken 
about the “One Belt, One Road” programme that offers US$30 billion for 
construction of roads in the region. These programmes have received positive 
response from the SAARC members. For instance, Nepalese Foreign Minister 
Mahendra Bahadur Pandey in March 2015, stated “Nepal will join the Silk 
Road Economic Belt as it has great significance to Nepal as it will enhance 
connectivity and take Nepal-China relations to a new height” (Xinhua, 2015). 
Similarly, Sri Lanka, Maldives and Pakistan have already extended support 
for China MSR initiatives. In addition, the Chinese government announced 
10,000 scholarships, 5,000 training opportunities, exchange programmes for 
5,000 youths, and sending 5,000 Chinese-language teachers to South Asian 
countries in the next five years (Zongyi, 2014). Furthermore, China has 
already been playing an active role in power projects, transportation, and other 
infrastructure construction overseas, particularly in developing countries. This 
Chinese eagerness for engaging with the region becomes more meaningful 
with the cooperation of SAARC. 
Seventh, although India opposes China’s full membership in SAARC, 
it has been successful in strengthening its bilateral ties with China and is a 
partner with China in BRICS (Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa), Group 
of 20 (G-20) and Group of 4 (G-4) groupings. Moreover, just as China is 
keen on becoming a SAARC member, India is campaigning to become a full-
fledged member of the SCO. In this context, President Xi Jinping had said that 
“China welcomes and supports India’s full membership in SCO, as it expects 
India to support China in building relations with SAARC so that our two 
countries can work together and contribute our due share to regional stability 
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and development” (Liu, 2014). Moreover, both China and India are playing a 
pro-active role in establishing the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar (BCIM) 
corridor, which will link Kolkata (capital of West Bengal) with Kunming 
(capital of Yunnan province), passing through Mandalay in Myanmar 
and Dhaka in Bangladesh. This project aims to improve the connectivity, 
infrastructure, energy resources, agriculture, trade [also intra-regional trade] 
and investment and will naturally bring about socio-economic development 
in the region (Sahoo and Bhunai, 2014). Thus, with joint initiatives and 
partnership, India can seek to utilise this opportunity as a diplomatic quid pro 
quo with China.
Eighth, most of the SAARC members are convinced that development of 
infrastructure in the region is a key to its growth. As a result, the theme of the 
18th SAARC summit was “deeper integration for peace and prosperity.” Even 
Prime Minister Narendra Modi made a pitch for connectivity in the region 
and emphasised that “infrastructure is our region’s greatest weakness and it 
is most pressing need” (Kumar, 2014). He also emphasised that coming to 
an agreement on energy, infrastructure and resolving shared problems would 
strengthen SAARC. Ironically, this summit failed to come to any significant 
agreement on road and rail connectivity. Thus, India needs to concede that 
it alone cannot carry forward SAARC; therefore, China’s entry into SAARC 
could be a great source of help in taking forward these objectives and 
China has already invested in the region, especially in Sri Lanka, Nepal and 
Pakistan, clearly demonstrating its potential. 
Ninth, China’s elevation in SAARC will also be beneficial to smaller 
countries like Bhutan and Maldives, as they will have new opportunities to 
take their relations with China to the next level, thereby strengthening their 
ties with China and resolve the border disputes (this applies particularly to 
Bhutan). 
5. India’s Major Concerns
For India, China has been an inconvenient neighbour and a major security 
concern – as for several decades, China was supporting anti-India movements; 
hampering India’s interests in most of the region; questioning Arunachal 
Pradesh and Sikkim as being part of the sovereign territory of India; and 
adamantly refusing to resolve border disputes (Malone and Mukherjee, 2010; 
Dutta, 2011a). It is to be expected that these bilateral irritants could have an 
impact on the working of SAARC. 
SAARC decisions are based on unanimity. A corollary is that, as a 
full-fledged SAARC member, China could obstruct key projects beneficial 
to India. A preview of this possibility was presented in 2009, when China 
successfully protested against the Asian Development Bank (ADB) US$2.9 
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billion loan-funding plan to India for a water management project in 
Arunachal Pradesh (Chansoria, 2015). Four years later, in 2013, the Indian 
government was forced yet again to drop Arunachal Pradesh and Sikkim 
from a World Bank loan proposal to avoid running into Chinese objections 
over multilateral financial aid for border-area projects such as strengthening 
electricity transmission and distribution in India’s north-eastern region.
This kind of Chinese obstructionist behaviour has been seen in ASEAN as 
well. For instance, China successfully blocked a resolution on the South China 
Sea dispute in June 2012 through Cambodia, its new-found ally. In that event, 
the ASEAN summit, for the first time in its 45-year history, closed without 
issuing a joint communiqué, due to Cambodia disallowing other countries 
from presenting their arguments. Rubbing salt into the wound, the former 
Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi declared that there was “no dispute” 
about China’s sovereignty over the reef and warned against internationalising 
the issue (Ranade, 2012). Given this historical experience, India needs to 
be on guard about Chinese intentions where India’s interests are concerned 
within the ambit of SAARC. 
Of particular concern for India would be China’s “all-weather friendship” 
with Pakistan. China has not only strengthened its military and nuclear ties 
with Pakistan, it is also a key investor in infrastructure projects there, which 
have security implications for India. More recently, during Chinese President 
Xi Jinping visit to Islamabad in April 2015, he signed 51 agreements (MOU)1 
and also unveiled the “China-Pakistan Economic Corridor” (CPEC) – a 
US$46 billion infrastructure project for Pakistan – which would open up new 
trade and transport routes across Asia and also counter US dominance in the 
region (Fazil, 2015). The proposed corridor will run from Kashgar in China to 
the Gwadar port in Pakistan. This project is considered to be a game changer 
for both countries as the project would economically benefit the poorest 
province in Pakistan and will provide China another access route to Indian 
Ocean and the Middle East region. However, India’s point of view is focused 
on security concerns, as the arteries of CPEC will originate in Gilgit Baltistan, 
in a way China legitimating Pakistan’s claim and control over the Pakistan 
occupied Kashmir (POK) (Singh, 2015).2 Thus, these growing relations are 
a symbol of strong friendship between China and Pakistan, which will have 
an impact on SAARC growth and also on the decisions taken at SAARC 
meetings. In addition, China’s deepening ties with Nepal, Bangladesh and Sri 
Lanka lead to the apprehension that a multivariate triangle or a more complex 
alignment involving China, and targeting India’s interests could develop in 
the region, such as China-Pakistan-Nepal, China-Pakistan-Nepal-Bangladesh, 
China-Pakistan-Nepal-Bangladesh-Sri Lanka or any of their variations. Thus, 
China’s strong ties with SAARC countries will have an impact on India’s 
strategic interest in SAARC. 
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In addition, China’s economic dominance will bring about certain 
challenges, such as: the region will have to confront the challenge posed 
by Chinese exports. Inevitably, these are going to impinge upon local 
manufacturing. In consequence, the weaker economies are likely to go under 
and become, essentially, exporters of raw materials (Dutta, 2011: 500), like 
what has happened to Central Asian countries. Resultantly, there will be a rise 
of trade imbalance. SAARC countries’ total trade deficit with China in 2012 
was more than US$47.8 billion, out of a total trade of US$73.9 billion, and of 
which India accounted for more than US$30 billion (Zongyi, 2014). China’s 
investment, aid and loan in the region have also thrown up challenges. In Sri 
Lanka, for example, many argue that China’s interest rates for infrastructure 
loans, ranging from 1.53 to 6.5 per cent, are much higher than rates from 
the World Bank and ADB (Tamil Guardian, 2014). Moreover, the current 
42 projects employ more than 1,700 Chinese workers and conservative 
estimates are that 25,000 Chinese workers are in various projects in Sri Lanka 
(Hariharan, 2013). Obviously, this phenomenon denies job opportunities 
for Sri Lankan labourers and there is also the prospect that many Chinese 
labourers might stay on in the country, causing security concerns for the 
Sri Lankan government. Hence, SAARC member countries need to reflect 
whether they need to have this scenario reflected in their own territories. 
In a nutshell, China’s membership into SAARC will bring both benefits 
and challenges. Nevertheless, before allowing China’s membership it is 
important for the SAARC members to assess in what ways China will help 
SAARC in terms of investment, aid, infrastructure and building people to 
people contact? Whether China’s entry will be worthwhile or will its expected 
domination further reduce the credibility and functioning of SAARC? What 
are the areas in which both India and China can cooperate for the benefit 
of SAARC? Hence, it is necessary for the policy makers in India and also 
SAARC members to make a cost-benefit analysis, before expanding its 
membership – inclusion of China, as its entry may transform SAARC in 
either a positive or negative way, which will have vast impact on the region 
in general and India in particular. However, the general trend seems to suggest 
that it is inevitable that China will become a SAARC member at some time 
in the future, for which India has to be prepared. 
India has to intelligently and sophisticatedly play its cards to advance 
its own interests in SAARC and ensure China’s entry does not weaken 
regionalism in the region. First, India needs to further enhance its ties with 
China, which is already happening, as the Modi-led government has given 
due importance to China, with the hosting of the visiting Chinese President in 
2014, followed by his own visit (May 2015). Both countries agreed to work 
jointly with Nepal for its “reconstruction, rehabilitation and development 
endeavours, respecting the country’s sovereignty and independence” (Giri, 
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2014). Subsequently, Modi also emphasised that “wherever possible and 
feasible, we should work together, as we did in responding to the earthquake 
in Nepal” (ibid). As a result, both India and China can work for a win-win 
situation in SAARC, which will be mutually beneficial and also for SAARC. 
Second, although, China is unlikely to be made a full member soon, however 
India should take the lead in inviting China to become a full member of 
SAARC, which will send a positive signal and eliminate the rift among the 
SAARC members over China’s membership. At the same time, India should 
also insist that other Observer members like Myanmar and Japan be made 
full members along with China; this will act as a strategy to counterweight 
China’s role in SAARC. Third, India should regain the strategic space in 
countries like Sri Lanka, Maldives, Mauritius and Seychelles to counter 
Chinese interest in the Indian Ocean region. This is already happening, 
as during Prime Minister Modi’s visit in March 2015 to these countries, 
he offered many military, defence and civilian assistance to reduce these 
countries dependence on China. Finally, it is in India and China’s interests 
to cooperate in this grouping to maximise its economic, energy and other 
strategic interests and also to promote and establish peace and security in the 
South Asian region.
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1.   For details of the agreements see Haider, Mateen and Haider, Irfan (2015), 
“Economic corridor in Focus as Pakistan, China sign MOUs”, DAWN 
(Islamabad), 20 April 2015, at <www.dawn.com/news/1177109>.
2.   In the Gilgit Baltistan segment, the CPEC project includes – expansion of the 
Karakoram Highway, establishing industrial parks in special economic zones, 
constructing hydropower projects, railway line and road building. The project 
also entails building hydropower projects and motorways and highways in the 
POK. See Singh, 2015.
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